Gastar submitted the claims to its insurers. They denied coverage pursuant to Condition C, the interrelationship-of-claims provision found in the two policies. According to the insurers, this provision deems the seven suits filed during the policy period to have been filed before the policy period because they relate back to the pre-policy suits.   Gastar then sued the insurers, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. After limited discovery, the insurers filed traditional motions for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the seven suits filed during the policy period were not actually within the relevant policy period by virtue of Condition C, the interrelation-ship-of-claims provision. The insurers argued that Condition C deems all claims that arise from the same facts, or from a series of related facts, to be a single claim made at the time of the earliest claim.   In response, Gastar filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment, asserting two points: (1) the seven suits filed during the policy period state securities claims as defined by the insurance policies; and (2) the claims raised by the plaintiffs in the suits filed during the policy period were first made during the policy period and Condition C does not preclude coverage.   The trial court granted the insurers’ motions for summary judgment and denied Gastar’s motion. This appeal followed.   The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It said that Condition C is effectively an exclusion because it narrows the coverage originally created. In other words, but for the operation of Condition C deeming the claims actually made during the policy period to have been made prior to the policy period, the insurers would be liable for covering the later claims.   The Court pointed out that Endorsement 10 to the policy has a narrower effect. It only excludes from coverage claims made during the policy period that “arising out of, based upon or attributable to any pending or prior litigation as of 5/31/2000, or alleging or derived from the same or essentially the same facts or circumstances as alleged in such pending prior litigation.”

  The Court said that Condition C effectively renders Endorsement 10 meaningless because any claims that would be excluded from coverage by Endorsement 10 would already be excluded by Condition C. The law in Texas is well-established that an interpretation rendering part of a contract meaningless is not reasonable.

 The Court held that Endorsement 10 restores coverage originally created that would have been excluded by Condition C.

 Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 57 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 617. Tenaska Energy sold a power generating plant to Ponderosa Pine Energy. The purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause.

  When a dispute arose later, Ponderosa initiated arbitration proceedings. Pursuant to the terms of the arbitration clause, Ponderosa designated Mr. Stern as arbitrator.

  Mr. Stern submitted his curriculum vitae and later a supplemental letter which listed several prior contacts with legal counsel for Ponderosa and with other businesses involved in the sale. It also listed his connections as a shareholder and member of the advisory board of LexSite, a litigation services company. Tenaska did not object to his appointment.

  After extensive hearings, the arbitration panel issued a 23-page opinion and award in Ponderosa’s favor. On the day the opinion issued, Ponderosa filed a petition to confirm the award in state district court. After the judgment and award issued from the district court, Tenaska hired an international private investigation firm to investigate Mr. Stern.

  When Tenaska received the investigator’s report, it filed motions to vacate the award alleging, among other things, that Mr. Stern was neither “impartial in every respect” nor “free from bias,” as required by the arbitration agreement. Tenaska alleged that Stern’s disclosure statement was edited by legal counsel for Ponderosa and that it omitted material facts with regard to LexSite’s contacts with legal counsel for Ponderosa.

  A hearing was held and the evidence showed that Mr. Stern owned shares of LexSite, was being paid for office space and services given to LexSite, marketed LexSite in the United States, was actively soliciting business for LexSite from legal counsel for Ponderosa, and discussed the possibility of LexSite and counsel for Ponderosa doing business.

  The trial court vacated the arbitration award, denied the motion to confirm, and ordered the parties to submit their dispute to a new arbitration panel.
The Court of Appeals said that Mr. Stern’s disclosure was sufficient to place Tenaska on notice of the facts giving rise to what they complained created a reasonable possibility of partiality respecting Mr. Stern’s relationship with counsel for Ponderosa. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by vacating the arbitration award on the basis that Mr. Stern had failed to fully disclose his relationships with LexSite, counsel for Ponderosa, and other matters, rendering him evidently partial. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment confirming the arbitration award.
The Texas Supreme Court said that the standard for evident partiality requires vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality, but information that is trivial will not rise to this level and need not be disclosed.

  The Supreme Court concluded that the information not disclosed was not trivial and might have conveyed an impression of Mr. Stern’s partiality toward counsel for Ponderosa to a reasonable person. The Court said that Mr. Stern had a duty to disclose the additional information and his failure to do so constitutes “evident partiality.” The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order vacating the award and requiring new arbitration.

  In re Whataburger Restaurants, L.P., 57 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 468. Mr. Acuna brought a premises liability suit against Whataburger based on injuries sustained in a fight outside a Whataburger restaurant. The jury rendered judgment in favor of Whataburger.

  After investigating jurors, Mr. Acuna filed a motion for new trial claiming that one of the ten jurors who had voted in favor of Whataburger, Ms. Chavez, had committed misconduct by failing to disclose that she had been a defendant in two prior credit card collection cases and a bankruptcy action. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, Ms. Chavez testified that she mistakenly failed to disclose the suits because she had never gone before a judge in those cases, it was an honest mistake, and that they had simply slipped her mind.

  The trial court found that Ms. Chavez did not complete her juror questionnaire correctly, that the mistake was material, and that it resulted in probable injury. The court granted Mr. Acuna’s motion for new trial on the ground that he was denied the opportunity to question or strike Ms. Chavez in light of the missing information.

  The Court of Appeals denied Whata-burger’s petition for writ of mandamus.

  The Supreme Court observed that for a party to get a new trial based on jury misconduct, the party must establish (1) that the misconduct occurred, (2) it was material, and (3) it probably caused injury. The complaining party has the burden to show all three elements before a new trial can be granted.

  The Supreme Court said that there was no evidence that Ms. Chavez’s failure to disclose her previous lawsuits resulted in probable injury. The Court said that a trial court may grant a new trial based on juror misconduct if it reasonably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion and the trial of the case and from the record as a whole that an injury probably resulted to the complaining party.

  The Supreme Court went on to say that although four jurors had disclosed that they had each been a defendant in a prior lawsuit, Mr. Acuna’s attorney did not question, challenge, or strike any of them, and one of them was seated on the jury and joined in the majority verdict. The Court said that Mr. Acuna provided no evidence to suggest that Ms. Chavez or her prior experience as a defendant in a lawsuit was in some way meaningfully different than the other prospective jurors’ experiences. The Court felt that Mr. Acuna’s attorney’s failure to question or strike those jurors contradicts his conclusory claim that he “would have” questioned or struck Ms. Chavez.

  The Supreme Court said that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. It therefore ordered the trial court to withdraw its order and render judgment on the verdict.